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State Sexual Harassment Definitions and 
Disaggregation of Sex Discrimination Claims 
Eleanor Frisch∗
For many courts, classic cases of sex discrimination have 
lost their appeal. In states that have adopted definitions of sex-
ual harassment, women who have faced denigrating or deroga-
tory treatment because of their gender have found their claims 
are not “sexy” enough for courts. In a startling example, a fe-
male police officer’s coworker repeatedly asserted that women 
should not be police officers.
 
1 He regularly teased and harassed 
her for being a woman,2 and even told her she should kill her-
self.3 Her complaints about his conduct went unheeded.4 One 
night, when the two were patrolling together, the officers shot 
and killed each other.5 Believing the shooting was a result of 
the harassment, the deceased woman’s sister brought suit for 
sex discrimination.6 On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that, under the state’s civil rights act, the claim was not 
cognizable because her attorneys had framed it as “sexual har-
assment.”7 The court found the conduct under question was not 
“sexual in nature” and therefore did not meet the definition for 
sexual harassment that the state’s legislature had adopted.8
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 1. See Appellee’s Brief on Appeal at 1, Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 
(Mich. 2003) (No. 120426) [hereinafter Haynie Appellee’s Brief on Appeal].  
 2. Id. at 1–2.  
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. at 1. 
 5. Id. at 1–2.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 131. 
 8. Id. at 135–36. Michigan’s civil rights act states that “[s]exual harass-
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A sex-discriminatory hostile work environment occurs 
when conduct, directed at a person because of his or her sex, is 
severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.9 Hostile work 
environment claims for sex discrimination have developed 
along two separate lines. Claims for “classic sex-based discrim-
ination,” hereinafter referred to as “non-sexual harassment,” 
where an employee is denigrated, ridiculed, scorned or other-
wise treated unequally simply for being a man or a woman, are 
directly derived from the language of civil rights acts prohibit-
ing discrimination “because of . . . sex.”10 On the other hand, 
“sexual harassment”—unwanted sexual advances and other 
conduct of a sexual nature—can also constitute a hostile work 
environment.11 Although the language of Title VII12 and many 
state civil rights acts do not use the words “sexual harass-
ment,” the “because of . . . sex” language has been interpreted 
to embrace sexual conduct.13 Accordingly, the EEOC and sever-
al state legislatures have promulgated or adopted specific defi-
nitions for what constitutes “sexual harassment.”14 This has re-
sulted in the development of sexual-specific15 rules for 
determining when sexual conduct rises to the level of a hostile 
work environment, effectively driving a wedge into sex discrim-
ination law. Sexual-specific rules and definitions have caused 
federal courts considering Title VII claims to separately consid-
er sexual and non-sexual conduct in a two-tiered analysis, pars-
ing out the sexual from the non-sexual incidents and ultimately 
deciding that neither alone is sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
constitute a hostile work environment, or that the “because 
of . . . sex” causation requirement is not met.16
 
ment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature” under certain 
conditions. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2103 (2013). 
 Several scholars 
 9. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). 
 10. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).  
 11. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 
(2013). 
 12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 13. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. 
 14. Id.; sources cited infra note 68.  
 15. “Sexual-specific” refers to rules that apply only to conduct of a sexual 
nature, such as sexual advances or conduct, requests for sexual favors, sexual 
touching, etc. 
 16. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1683, 1689–90 (1998) (“When severed from a larger pattern of [discrimi-
nation], sexual advances or ridicule can appear insufficiently severe or perva-
  
2014] DISAGGREGATION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1945 
 
have touched on this issue,17
Yet no scholars have focused their analysis of the issue on 
interpretation of state law, where the disaggregation problem 
abounds
 hereinafter referred to as the “dis-
aggregation problem” because it disaggregates sex discrimina-
tion law by treating sexual and non-sexual harassment as two 
separate types of discrimination. 
18 and, in some states, sexual harassment definitions 
are explicitly incorporated into civil rights statutes.19 Courts in 
these states are developing a worrisome pattern of rejecting 
classic sex-based discrimination claims either because incidents 
of non-sexual, sex-based harassment (hereinafter, “non-sexual 
harassment”) cannot be considered in assessing these claims,20 
or because non-sexual harassment just is not bad enough to 
meet the “severe-or-pervasive” requirement.21
 
sive . . . .”); see also Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding a female employee failed to prove a hostile work envi-
ronment after separately considering her coworkers’ lewd comments as sexual 
harassment and her claim that her discharge was gender-based discrimina-
tion), aff’d, 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986), abrogated by Brooms v. Regal Tube 
Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); sources cited infra note 
 These cases show 
51. 
 17. See Ruth Colker, Whores, Fags, Dumb-Ass Women, Surly Blacks, and 
Competent Heterosexual White Men: The Sexual and Racial Morality Underly-
ing Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195, 198–200 
(1995) (noting that courts have narrowed claims to those of a sexualized na-
ture and that “sexual harassment doctrine contains some troubling, limiting 
principles that have begun to influence the rest of anti-discrimination law”); 
Schultz, supra note 16 (providing a thorough survey of the disaggregation 
problems in the federal courts). 
 18. See, e.g., Haberman v. Cengage Learning, Inc., 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 
31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (dismissing “[m]ost of the alleged incidents” because 
they were “not sexual in nature”); Hale v. Haw. Publ’ns, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 
1210, 1221 (D. Haw. 2006) (finding sex discrimination claim was time barred 
because the sexually-charged harassing conduct occurred prior to the cut-off 
date, and “none of the Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants’ [other] be-
havior . . . such as intensified supervision, interference with her accounts, con-
structive discharge, or [a] threatening incident . . . are of a sexual nature”). 
 19. Sources cited infra note 68. 
 20. See, e.g., Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(finding plaintiff had “narrowed her claim” to conduct “of a sexual nature,” 
although “acts of intimidation could comprise part of a pattern of sexual har-
assment” when considered in context); Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 140 
(Mich. 2003) (requiring conduct to be sexual in nature). 
 21. See Hoffelt v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Rights, 867 N.E.2d 14, 18 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2006) (holding non-sexual harassment and inaccurate performance evalua-
tion based on sex do not establish a severe or pervasive change in the daily 
conditions of employment); LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 
14 (Minn. 2012) (reaching the Minnesota Supreme Court on the question of 
whether conduct is required to be sexual in nature, and holding that although 
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that, because of the effect and operation of sexual harassment 
definitions, the disaggregation phenomenon that other scholars 
have identified at the federal level is much more pronounced 
and explicit at the state level. Several state courts have deter-
mined that framing a sex discrimination claim as “sexual har-
assment” limits the scope of the action to exclude any conduct 
that is not sexual in nature,22 and even in other states, courts 
may view harmful discriminatory behavior that is non-sexual 
as less severe or pervasive, or less likely to be gender-
motivated, than sexual conduct.23
Essentially, states’ statutory definitions for sexual har-
assment have formally severed the law of sex discrimination, 
prejudicing plaintiffs whose claims include elements of classic 
discrimination—non-sexual harassment. This Note explores 
this problem. Part I introduces the disaggregation problem, 
moving from the federal to state level, and discusses the opera-
tion of sexual-specific statutory definitions in recent state court 
opinions. Part II analyzes the effect of statutory definitions for 
sexual harassment on sex discrimination cases based on non-
sexual, rather than sexual, harassment, or a mix of both 
(“mixed cases” or “mixed harassment”). Part III considers the 
pros and cons of developing statutory definitions and calls for a 
reshaping of state-level statutory definitions and discrimina-
tion provisions. This Note ultimately proposes methods for 
dealing with the disaggregation problem in state courts, includ-
ing adopting “aggregation rules” and “aggregation provisions,” 
and re-evaluating policies’ singular focus on sexual harass-
ment. 
  
I.  FROM FEDERAL TO STATE: THE LANDSCAPE OF THE 
DISAGGREGATION PROBLEM   
Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act (CRA) makes it il-
legal to discriminate or deny someone employment privileges 
“because of . . . sex.”24
 
it is not, the conduct in this case did not meet the “severe-or-pervasive” re-
quirement). 
 Today, courts and the general public take 
 22. E.g., Gray, 289 F.3d at 135–36; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 140. 
 23. See, e.g., LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 19, 22–24 (concluding that non-
sexual conduct should be considered but that segregating women, imposing a 
rule of silence on women but not men, and making dozens of denigrating 
comments about women were not severe or pervasive enough to constitute a 
hostile work environment and implying harassment may not have been gen-
der-motivated). 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
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it for granted that “sexual harassment” is a form of workplace 
sex discrimination.25 However, courts originally rejected the no-
tion that employers who terminated or punished employees for 
rejecting sexual advances or who created a sexually-charged 
work environment were discriminating “because of . . . sex.”26 
Only later did sexual harassment come to be seen as the quin-
tessential form of sex-based workplace harassment.27 As sexual 
harassment legal doctrines developed, federal courts began ap-
plying a two-tiered analysis that separates out the sexual and 
non-sexual incidents of harassment, imposing serious obstacles 
for non-sexual harassment plaintiffs.28
This Part maps the landscape of the disaggregation prob-
lem in four parts. Part A explains how sexual harassment came 
to be seen as the quintessential form of sex discrimination and 
how this resulted in claim disaggregation. Part B highlights the 
serious harms of non-sexual harassment in the workplace. 
Parts C and D show, respectively, the prevalence of state statu-
tory sexual harassment definitions and how courts’ interpreta-
tions of those definitions have allowed the disaggregation prob-
lem to flourish at the state level.  
 This issue has solidified 
and come to the forefront at the state level, and states’ adoption 
of sexual-specific, statutory definitions of sexual harassment 
and the resulting case law offer an ideal lens through which to 
examine its negative effects.  
A. HOW “SEXUAL” CAME TO THE FOREFRONT OF HARASSMENT 
CLAIMS 
Feminists viewed the courts’ early refusal to recognize un-
wanted sexual advances and comments as sex discrimination 
as harmful to women, since they saw unwanted sexual advanc-
 
 25. See infra note 54. 
 26. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 
(D.N.J. 1976) (“[S]exual harassment and sexually motivated assault do not 
constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.”), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 
1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 
1974) (“The substance of plaintiff's complaint is that she was discriminated 
against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to engage in a 
sexual affair with her supervisor. This is a controversy underpinned by the 
subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship. Regardless of how inex-
cusable the conduct of plaintiff's supervisor might have been, it does not evi-
dence an arbitrary barrier to continued employment based on plaintiff's sex.”), 
rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
 27. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1796 (“[C]ourts began to view sexual 
advances as the quintessential form of gender-based harassment . . . .”).  
 28. See generally id. 
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es in the workplace as a manifestation of suppressive discrimi-
natory regimes and even an extension of the act of rape.29 The 
feminist legal community struggled to carve out of Title VII a 
sex discrimination claim based on unwanted sexual advances 
or sexually explicit conduct.30 Eventually, federal courts did 
begin to recognize sexual-based harassment as discrimination 
“because of . . . sex,” on the theory that the causation require-
ment was met because heterosexuals would only target one sex 
with their sexual advances.31 Eventually, courts would find 
causation even in same-sex cases, as long as the plaintiff could 
prove that the harasser had made sexual advances and was at-
tracted to the same-sex.32
In the 1980s and ‘90s, the idea that sexual harassment was 
a form of sex discrimination gained momentum in the courts, 
the media, and the government.
 
33 Borrowing from race discrim-
ination cases,34 a branch of law grew out of the notion that a 
workplace charged with unwanted sexuality could create a hos-
tile work environment, since the harassment itself affected the 
terms or conditions of employment.35
 
 29. See id. at 1698–99 (“[S]exual desire and domination were inextricably 
linked in the institution of heterosexuality. . . . ‘[A]ll sexist behavior [wa]s an 
extension of the paradigmatic act of rape.’” (quoting Ellen Willis, Radical Fem-
inism and Feminist Radicalism, in NO MORE NICE GIRLS: COUNTERCULTURAL 
ESSAYS 117, 144 (1992))). 
 Thus, the courts devel-
oped two alternative routes for establishing a valid sexual har-
assment claim: “quid pro quo” sexual harassment, where the 
terms and privileges of employment are actually conditioned on 
acceptance of sexual advances, and “hostile work environment” 
sexual harassment, where the presence of “severe or pervasive” 
sexual advances or conduct creates an environment that is so 
 30. See id. at 1702–03. 
 31. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 (“[B]arnes became the target of her superior’s 
sexual desires because she was a woman. . . . [N]o male employee was suscep-
tible to such an approach by appellant’s supervisor. . . . Thus [Barnes] . . . ad-
vances a prima facie case of sex discrimination within the purview of Title 
VII.”). 
 32. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
 33. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1692–1732. 
 34. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (outlining the 
hostile work environment doctrine in the racial context). 
 35. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1707–08 (discussing the emergence of 
hostile work environment cases based on unwanted sexuality). 
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intolerably sexually charged as to affect workplace conditions 
for an employee.36
Perhaps understanding that “sex sells,” the media quickly 
began paying more attention to the sexually charged cases than 
the classic sex discrimination cases.
 
37
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual har-
assment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly 
or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) 
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as 
the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) 
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment.
 As if on cue, in 1980 the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) adopted 
the following guidelines: 
38
To this day, these sexual-specific guidelines remain in ef-
fect without any explanation of how they interact with the ele-
ments of a non-sexual harassment claim,
 
39 despite the fact that 
the EEOC’s own data shows that the majority of Title VII 
claims are non-sexual.40 Employers have embraced the guide-
lines, creating numerous policies that either focus on “sexual 
harassment” or completely discount non-sexual harassment of 
employees.41
 
 36. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67–68 (1986) 
(criticizing the lower court for relying on the quid pro quo harassment doctrine 
when hostile environment was also a potential route).  
 Meanwhile, new studies suggest non-sexual har-
assment can be more psychologically harmful to employees, and 
 37. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1692 (noting that the “most publicized 
harassment cases” such as the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas scandal “have ac-
centuated” the sexual paradigm). 
 38. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 
74,677 (Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).  
 39. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 
(2013). 
 40. Model EEO Programs Must Have an Effective Anti-Harassment Pro-
gram, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/model_eeo_programs.cfm#policies 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (finding that “non-sexual harassment is the issue 
most frequently raised in EEO complaints”). 
 41. See, e.g., Livingston Bd. of Educ., Policy 5751: Sexual Harassment, 
LIVINGSTON.ORG (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.livingston.org/cms/lib4/NJ010005 
62/Centricity/Domain/14/Policies/Section%205000/Policy%205751%20-% 
20Sexual%20Harassment.pdf (“Nonsexual touching or other nonsexual con-
duct does not constitute sexual harassment.”); School Policies: Policy on Sexu-
al Harassment, SUCCESS SCHS. LLC, http://successschoolsllc.com/school 
-policies-1.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014) (focusing on sexual harassment).  
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can interfere more with work, than unwanted sexual advances 
or comments.42
To aid in understanding the problem, hostile work envi-
ronment claims based on sex discrimination can be viewed as 
falling into three categories: classic or “non-sexual harass-
ment,” “sexual harassment,” and “mixed harassment.” Non-
sexual harassment may come in the form of derogatory or deni-
grating statements, differential treatment, or adverse employ-
ment conditions based on one’s status as a man or a woman. 
One common example is competence-undermining; employers 
may not take female workers seriously and may humiliate 
them, refer to them as “dumb,” and remind them they cannot 
perform a “man’s job.”
  
43 “Sexual harassment” typically involves 
sexually explicit comments, sexual touching, or sexual advanc-
es. In what this Note describes as a “mixed harassment” 
claim,44 an employee experiences both non-sexual and sexual 
harassment in combination. For example, an employer or 
coworkers may make derogatory remarks about women’s com-
petence, deny women training opportunities, and also employ 
sexual touching, winking, and sexual advances.45
All of these claims are forms of sex discrimination, yet 
courts tend to view sexual and non-sexual harassment claims 
as mutually exclusive, making it very difficult for victims of 
mixed and non-sexual harassment to obtain relief. Vicki 
Schultz performed a comprehensive analysis of federal sex dis-





 42. See Rick Nauert, Non-Sexual Worksite Harassment Is More Harmful, 
PSYCHCENTRAL (March 10, 2008), http://psychcentral.com/news/2008/03/10/ 
non-sexual-worksite-harassment-is-more-harmful/2020.html (noting that, 
among other things, non-sexual harassment led to higher anxiety, more job 
stress, and a higher rate of leaving jobs). 
 Schultz first established that many feder-
al court opinions have altogether discounted valid sex-based 
discrimination claims because they were non-sexual in na-
 43. See, e.g., Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1543, 1545–46 
(10th Cir. 1995) (noting allegations by plaintiff that she had been referred to 
as “dumb” and humiliated at work); supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text 
(noting allegations of humiliation at work and being told the work was a man’s 
job). 
 44. Not to be confused with a “mixed-motive” case. A “mixed-motive case” 
is one “where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated [an employ-
ment decision].” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003). 
 45. Cf., e.g., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 211–12 (7th Cir. 
1986) (alleging sexual advances as well as a gender-based discharge). 
 46. Schultz, supra note 16. 
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ture.47 “[W]hen presented with evidence of nonsexual miscon-
duct, judges have tended to miss any harmful gender dynamics 
involved.”48 She then showed how federal courts that do consid-
er the non-sexual components of a discrimination claim tend to 
parse them out from the sexually-charged incidents of harass-
ment, in effect turning mixed harassment claims into two sepa-
rate claims—one for non-sexual harassment and one for sexual 
harassment.49 The result is that it is difficult for women with 
primarily non-sexual harassment or mixed claims to sufficient-
ly establish the severe-or-pervasive or “because of . . . sex” re-
quirements for one or the other, even if the harassment may be 
sufficiently severe or pervasive, or clearly because of sex, when 
both sexual and non-sexual components are viewed in combina-
tion.50 A proper application of the law would view incidents of 
mixed harassment in the aggregate, since they are all 
“discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.” Despite this, courts 
seem largely unaware of the effect of a two-tiered approach or 
the gender dynamics involved in non-sexual or mixed harass-
ment claims, and at the federal level the disaggregation prob-
lem persists.51
B. THE HARMS OF NON-SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
  
Scientific studies of the effects of harassment have also de-
veloped along separate lines, isolating “sexual” from “non-
sexual” workplace aggression.52
 
 47. Id. at 1733. 
 However, several recent studies 
 48. Id. at 1739. 
 49. See id. at 1739–44 (discussing how courts generally address sexual 
and non-sexual allegations as two separate causes of action).  
 50. See id. at 1720–21 (explaining the effect of disaggregation on the se-
vere-or-pervasive requirement and noting that “when separated from sexual 
advances and other sexual conduct, the nonsexual actions may appear to be 
gender-neutral forms of hazing with which the law should not interfere”). 
 51. See, e.g., Gupta v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 583–86 (11th Cir. 
2000) (conflating “gender-related” conduct with conduct of a “sexual nature,” 
and then analyzing the sexual conduct on its own); St. Louis v. N.Y.C. Health 
& Hosp. Corp., 682 F. Supp. 2d 216, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding, for purposes 
of determining when the statute of limitations ran, that harassment “perme-
ated with gender-based animus of a non-sexual nature” is “unrelated” to the 
“alleged acts of sexual harassment” and therefore defendant’s conduct cannot 
be said to form ‘one unlawful employment practice’”); Sessom v. Home Depot 
U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:05CV84–P–B, 2006 WL 3210484, at *9 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 
2006) (“It would seem better to avoid confusion by distinguishing hostile work 
environment sexual harassment based on sexual misconduct from hostile work 
environment based on gender discrimination.”).  
 52. See Laurent M. Lapierre et al., Sexual Versus Nonsexual Workplace 
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have performed meta-analyses to determine whether non-
sexual and sexual harassment have different effects on victims 
and whether one is more harmful than the other.53 Based on 
the amount of attention sexual forms of harassment receive, 
one might suspect that sexual harassment is more harmful 
than non-sexual sex discrimination.54 However, the empirical 
evidence shows that, in all probability, the opposite is true: non-
sexual harassment likely has a greater impact on victims’ 
health, attitudes, and overall job satisfaction.55
Ironically, one of the factors that cause non-sexual har-
assment to be more harmful is society’s focus on eradicating 
sexually harassing conduct.
 
56 Because victims see employers 
and the media giving great attention to sexual harassment, 
they may be more likely to believe that they have the tools to 
stop the harassment and hold their harassers accountable.57
 
Aggression and Victims’ Overall Job Satisfaction: A Meta-Analysis, 10 J. OC-
CUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 155, 155 (2005) (“[W]ith few exceptions, the 
empirical literatures on sexual and nonsexual aggression have grown along 
separate lines.” (citations omitted)). 
 
 53. See generally M. Sandy Hershcovis & Julian Barling, Comparing Vic-
tim Attributions and Outcomes for Workplace Aggression and Sexual Harass-
ment, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 874 (2010) (comparing the attitudinal, behav-
ioral, and health outcomes of workplace aggression and sexual harassment); 
Lapierre, supra note 52; Bullying More Harmful than Sexual Harassment on 
the Job, Say Researchers, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Mar. 8, 2008), 
http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2008/03/bullying.aspx; Nauert, supra 
note 42.  
 54. See Hershcovis & Barling, supra note 53, at 875 (“Legal attention to 
sexual harassment has created significant awareness of and policy aimed at 
preventing workplace sexual harassment; workplace aggression has not re-
ceived the same level of attention.”).  
 55. See id. at 874 (“Negative outcomes of workplace aggression were 
stronger in magnitude than those of sexual harassment for 6 of the 8 outcome 
variables.”); Lapierre, supra note 52, at 165 (“[R]esults indicate that the nega-
tive relationship between nonsexual aggression and victims’ overall job satis-
faction . . . is significantly stronger than the one between sexual aggression 
and victims’ overall job satisfaction . . . .”). It should be noted that both of the-
se studies include “gender harassment” as one of three forms of “sexual har-
assment.” Hershcovis & Barling, supra note 53 at 875; Lapierre, supra note 
52, at 156. However, due to the more subtle and inconspicuous nature of the 
non-sexual aggression that stems from sex discrimination, many incidents of 
sex discrimination were likely categorized as “non-sexual aggression” and 
their effects captured in those results, and, even if this were not the case, in 
theory, had the studies separated out non-sexual “gender” harassment, it like-
ly still would have been found to be more harmful for the same reasons.  
 56. See Lapierre, supra note 52, at 157–58 (discussing some of the poten-
tial effects the attention on sexual harassment may have on individuals expe-
riencing other forms of harassment).  
 57. Id. 
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While the awareness-raising efforts surrounding sexual har-
assment have empowered women to fight back, because non-
sexual harassment has received little attention, women may 
not understand the illegal nature of their harassers’ conduct 
and therefore may feel powerless to stop it.58 For example, em-
ployers rarely display posters prohibiting or defining non-
sexual harassment as discrimination in the workplace. Thus, 
employees might feel they do not have the legal or linguistic 
tools to fight this form of sex discrimination,59 or that non-
sexual harassment is more likely to reoccur in the workplace.60 
Moreover, victims of sexual harassment may be less likely to 
internalize their harassers’ viewpoints.61
C. ENCAPSULATING THE DISAGGREGATION PROBLEM IN STATE 
DEFINITIONS 
 The end result is that 
non-sexual workplace harassment likely has a more harmful 
effect on women’s psyche, and their careers.  
Almost all state legislatures—forty-seven plus the District 
of Columbia—have adopted general civil rights statutes prohib-
iting discrimination in the workplace.62 Most of the statutes’ 
language mirrors that of the federal Civil Rights Act63 or some-
thing similar, including the “because of . . . sex.”64
 
 58. See id. (describing the potential for “fear and hopelessness” among 
such victims). 
 It should be 
 59. See id.  
 60. See id. (“[V]ictims of nonsexual aggression may experience stronger 
negative outcomes . . . because nonsexual aggression could be viewed as more 
likely to reoccur in their organization than would sexual aggression.”). 
 61. See Hershcovis & Barling, supra note 53, at 875 (“Female victims of 
sexual harassment may be more likely than victims of [non-sexual] workplace 
aggression to depersonalize their experience of mistreatment and attribute it 
to the perpetrator’s prejudice toward their gender group.”). 
 62. See State Laws on Employment-Related Discrimination, NAT’L CON-
FERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
labor-and-employment/discrimination-employment.aspx; see, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. § 18.80.220 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402 (2013); D.C. CODE § 2-
1402.11 (2013); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:332 (2013); 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030 (2013); S.C. CODE 
§ 1-13-80 (2013); TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051 (2011); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-2 (2013). 
The three states that have not adopted private employment civil rights stat-
utes with private rights of action are Alabama, Mississippi, and North Caroli-
na. See Royster v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 595, 608 (M.D.N.C. 
2005) (“North Carolina courts have not recognized a private cause of action 
under the [North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act].”); State Laws on 
Employment-Related Discrimination, supra note 62. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 64. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1463 (2014) (“because of . . . sex”); FLA. 
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no surprise, then, that disaggregation problems abound at the 
state level just as they do at the federal level.65 In addition, un-
usual formations of the anti-discrimination statute, such as the 
variation found in California,66 can further contribute to dis-
aggregation problems by compelling courts to parse out “har-
assment” from “discrimination,” creating two distinct causes of 
action and making a further mess of the law.67
However, some states’ civil rights statutes have created a 
novel problem. While the federal legislature never adopted lan-
guage specific to “sexual” harassment, a handful of state legis-
latures—nine, to be precise—have done so.
 
68 Other states may 
include sexual-specific language or statutory definitions of 
“sexual harassment” in other sections of their codes, such as 
the rules of judicial conduct.69 Many state statutes include sub-
divisions requiring employers to develop sexual harassment 
policies.70 These provisions often go so far as to require employ-
ers to inform employees of the definition of “sexual harass-
ment,” provide employees with specific examples of sexual har-
assment on the job, and hang signs about sexual harassment in 
the workplace.71 State legislatures usually base the language of 
their statutory sexual harassment definitions on the EEOC’s 
guidelines.72
 
STAT. § 760.10 (2013) (“because of . . . sex”); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (“because 
of, or on a basis of . . . sex”).  
 Most of the state statutes that connect the defini-
 65. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18. 
 66. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act contains two inde-
pendent clauses, one prohibiting discrimination “because of . . . sex,” CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (2012), and one prohibiting harassment “because of . . . 
sex,” id. § 12940(j)(1). 
 67. See Miller v. Dep’t of Corr., 115 P.3d 77, 86 n.5 (Cal. 2005) (“[C]laims 
for sexual discrimination and sexual harassment are distinct causes of action, 
each arising from different provisions of the FEHA.”). 
 68. See Conn. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (2013); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
101 (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 37.2103(i) (2013); MINN. STAT. § 363A.03 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102 
(2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02 (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d 
(2013); WIS. STAT. § 111.32 (2014).  
 69. See, e.g., COL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3, cmt. 4 (2010) (“Sex-
ual harassment includes but is not limited to sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that is 
unwelcome.”). 
 70. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-124 (2011).  
 71. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12950(a) (“Each employer shall post the 
amended poster [on discrimination and sexual harassment] in a prominent 
and accessible location in the workplace.”); sources cited infra note 208. 
 72. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (defining “sexual harass-
ment” as “any unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors or any 
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tion to the general civil rights provision do so by stating that 
discrimination because of sex “includes” sexual harassment or 
that sexual harassment is “a form of” sex discrimination.73
One might suspect that the inclusion of these sexual-
specific statutory definitions exacerbates the disaggregation 
problems in these courts and state courts’ tendency to overlook 
non-sexual conduct. However, recent developments show that 
the problem is much worse than that. The statutory sexual 
harassment definitions have effectively driven a wedge in 




D. THE OPERATION OF STATUTORY SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
DEFINITIONS 
  
In particular, at least three court decisions—LaMont v. In-
dependent School District No. 728,75 Haynie v. State,76 and Gray 
v. Genlyte Group, Inc.77
 
conduct of a sexual nature when (A) submission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (B) 
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis 
for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (C) such conduct has 
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual’s work per-
formance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environ-
ment”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1 (defining “sexual harassment” as “sex-
ual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct 
of a sexual nature when (a) submission to or rejection of such advances, re-
quests or conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of 
employment or as a basis for employment decisions; (b) such advances, re-
quests or conduct have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with 
an individual’s work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, humili-
ating or sexually offensive work environment”). But see WIS. STAT. § 111.32 
(dropping the requirement that the harassment affect a term, condition, or de-
cision of employment, interfere with the individual’s work, or create a hostile 
environment, and including specific examples of “unwelcome verbal or physi-
cal conduct of a sexual nature”). 
—explicitly analyze the effect of state 
 73. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 1; MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 37.2103(i); MINN. STAT. § 363A.03; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02; VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 495d. But see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (defining sexual 
harassment without clearly prohibiting it, although a proposed bill would re-
solve this seemingly technical error, see S.B. 385, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Feb. 
Sess. (Conn. 2014)); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102 (outlawing “unlawful dis-
crimination” and “sexual harassment,” in separate subdivisions); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 48-1102 (specifically prohibiting employees from “harass[ing]” or “oth-
erwise discriminat[ing]” because of sex, and defining “harass because of sex”). 
 74. See infra Part I.D.3 (exploring mixed harassment claims). 
 75. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2012). 
 76. Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2003). 
 77. Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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statutory sexual harassment definitions on sex discrimination 
claims.78 While in all three cases appellate courts purported to 
hold that non-sexual harassment was unlawful under the re-
spective civil rights statutes, all three officially bifurcated sex 
discrimination law, creating two separate causes of action—one 
sexual, and the other non-sexual. Furthermore, two out of the 
three courts found that mentioning “sexual harassment” in the 
complaint could render a non-sexual harassment claim inva-
lid.79
1. Haynie v. State: Barring Purely Non-Sexual Harassment 
Claims 
 The ultimate result is the dismissal of meritorious claims.  
In Haynie, the appellate court dismissed a claim in its en-
tirety for being non-sexual in nature.80 Virginia Rich, the fe-
male police officer described in this Note’s introduction, was as-
signed to the Michigan State Capitol Security unit along with a 
male co-worker, Canute Findsen.81 After making numerous in-
appropriate comments about women and harassing Rich and 
other women on the force, Findsen’s behavior allegedly escalat-
ed to the point where Rich began “secretly carry[ing] a hidden 
tape recorder during her work hours.”82 Rich’s father had com-
mitted suicide a few years prior to Rich’s death by shooting 
himself in the head, and several times Findsen allegedly pre-
sented Rich with a bullet to use on herself and once even wrote 
a note suggesting to Rich that she should kill herself “using the 
bullet in her daddy’s gun.”83 Although Rich complained to her 
supervisors, her complaints were ignored.84
 
 78. See id. at 134–36 (analyzing whether an error occurred if “the district 
court effectively told the jury that it could not consider non-sexual conduct but 
only conduct that was either explicitly sexual or had ‘sexual overtones’”); 
Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 130–31 (considering “whether gender-based harass-
ment that is not at all sexual in nature is sufficient to establish a claim of sex-
ual harassment under the Civil Rights Act”); LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 18 (“We 
turn to the first question: whether a hostile work environment claim brought 
under the MHRA may be based on harassing conduct that is based on sex, 
even if the offending conduct is not sexual.”). 
  
 79. See generally Gray, 289 F.3d at 135–36; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 140. 
 80. Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 140 (reversing the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals and reinstating the order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants). 
 81. Haynie Appellee’s Brief on Appeal, supra note 1, at 1.  
 82. Id. at 2. 
 83. Id. at 1–2.  
 84. See id. at 1 (describing Rich’s requests not to work with Findsen any-
more). 
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One night, Rich and Findsen were making rounds in a pa-
trol car.85 The complete facts are forever lost, but at some point, 
the two police officers exited the vehicle and shot and killed 
each other.86 Rich’s sister, Carol Haynie, sued under Michigan’s 
Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101.87 
While Haynie sued under the entire Act, her attorneys often 
framed the claim as one for hostile work environment due to 
“sexual harassment.”88
The Michigan civil rights statute prohibits employers from 
discriminating “because of . . . sex”
  
89 and states that 
“[d]iscrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment.”90 
The statute goes on to define sexual harassment as requiring 
conduct of a “sexual nature,” and uses language substantially 
similar to the EEOC’s guidelines.91 In a previous case, the court 
had found that non-sexual harassment based on sex could con-
stitute “sexual harassment.”92 In Haynie, however, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court overruled its previous decision and held 
that “only conduct or communication that is sexual in nature 
can constitute sexual harassment.”93 While non-sexual conduct 
could serve as the basis for a sex discrimination claim, the 
court said “sexual harassment is another type of discrimina-
tion,”94 and “a claim of sexual harassment must prove some-
thing considerably different . . . .”95 Although the harassment 
Rich experienced could support a viable sex discrimination 
cause of action, Haynie had alleged that Rich was “sexually 
harassed,”96 so her claim failed.97
 
 85. Id. at 2. 
  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2101 (2013)). 
 88. See, e.g., Haynie Appellee’s Brief on Appeal, supra note 1, at 9 (“The 
elements for a hostile work environment/sexual harassment claim were set 
forth in . . . [a prior Michigan case].”). 
 89. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202.  
 90. Id. § 37.2103. 
 91. See generally id. (defining sexual harassment). 
 92. See Koester v. City of Novi, 580 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Mich. 1998) 
(“[H]arassment on the basis of a woman’s pregnancy is sexual harassment.”), 
overruled by Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2003). 
 93. Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 135. 
 94. Id. at 134 (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. (emphasis added).  
 96. Id. at 135. 
 97. Id. at 135–36 (“In this case, plaintiff concedes that there were no ‘un-
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other verbal or phys-
ical conduct or communication of a sexual nature . . . .’ Accordingly, plaintiff 
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2. LaMont v. Independent School District No. 728: 
Insufficiency of Non-Sexual Harassment Claims 
LaMont is another case involving primarily non-sexual 
harassment.98 When a new employee took over supervision of 
Carol LaMont’s night shift as a high school custodian, her once 
peaceful working hours were replaced with humiliation, psy-
chological torment, and degrading comments about women.99 
LaMont alleged her new supervisor openly told her he did not 
want women on his crew.100 He would not allow female employ-
ees to speak and told male workers not to talk to them.101 He 
required the women to take on additional work and segregated 
them from the men.102 “Women have their place,” he said.103 
“You’ve got to keep them in their place.”104 At one point, he 
forced LaMont to clean the top rows of bleachers, despite the 
fact that she was previously exempted from this task due to a 
severe fear of heights, and then he proceeded to ridicule her for 
her phobia.105 Although LaMont reported these problems to her 
supervisor, the school district made no real efforts to resolve 
the situation.106
LaMont submitted a complaint under the Minnesota Hu-
man Rights Act (MHRA),
 
107 which prohibits an employer from 
discriminating against an employee “because of . . . sex.”108 The 
Minnesota legislature has provided that sex discrimination “in-
cludes” sexual harassment, and has adopted a specific statutory 
definition for sexual harassment requiring conduct of a “sexual 
nature,” mirroring the EEOC’s guidelines.109
 
clearly has not established a claim of sexual harassment . . . .” (alteration in 
original)).  
 The state court of 
 98. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Minn. 2012) 
(describing differential treatment of employees based on sex). 
 99. See generally Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix, LaMont, 814 N.W.2d 14 
(No. A10-543) [hereinafter LaMont Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix].  
 100. Id. at 4.  
 101. Id. at 3, 9. 
 102. Id. at 3. 
 103. Id. at 4. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 8. 
 106. See id. at 11 (explaining that the school district’s investigator never 
even spoke to the supervisor about his harassing conduct). 
 107. See LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Minn. 
2012). 
 108. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subd. 2 (2013) (describing unfair employment 
practices). 
 109. See id. § 363A.03, subd. 13 (defining discriminate); id. subd. 43 (defin-
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appeals affirmed the dismissal of LaMont’s hostile work envi-
ronment case on summary judgment,110 holding that a work-
place sex discrimination claim based on harassment that was 
not sexual in nature was not actionable under the MHRA.111
LaMont appealed, arguing that, like the federal CRA con-
taining nearly identical language,
  
112 the MHRA broadly prohib-
its sex discrimination, not merely discrimination that is sexual 
in nature.113 The Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the 
holding on the non-sexual harassment issue, finding that “the 
MHRA permits a hostile work environment claim based on sex, 
separate and apart from its prohibition of sexual harass-
ment . . . .”114 However, the Minnesota Supreme Court ultimate-
ly held that the harassment LaMont experienced was not “se-
vere or pervasive” enough to “alter the conditions of the 
plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.”115 The court found that the denigrating comments about 
women were “not severe or intimidating” or “physically threat-
ening.”116 It noted that since LaMont’s supervisor also yelled at 
male employees there was no reason to think the yelling and 
other harsh treatment was “because of . . . sex.”117 The court 
found that the segregation and order of silence imposed on the 
female employees was not enough to “impair[] [their] job per-
formance.”118 The court did not consider any of the sexual com-
ments LaMont had mentioned in her brief.119
3. Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc.: Mixed Claim Splitting 
  
In Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc.,120
 
ing sexual harassment). 
 one of the first opinions to 
explicitly consider the effect of a state’s sexual harassment def-
inition, a jury was instructed to discard non-sexual conduct in a 
 110. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, No. A10-543, 2011 WL 292131, at 
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011), aff’d, 814 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2012). 
 111. LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 16. 
 112. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 113. See LaMont Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 99, at 16–37. 
 114. LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 19 (emphasis added).  
 115. Id. at 21–22. 
 116. Id. at 22. 
 117. See id. at 23 (“Th[e] evidence . . . suggests that [LaMont’s supervisor’s] 
harsh conduct was directed at the entire workforce and not at LaMont person-
ally or the female employees exclusively.”). 
 118. Id. at 22. 
 119. Compare id., with LaMont Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 
99. 
 120. Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2002). 
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mixed harassment claim. During her seventeen years employed 
at a Genlyte factory, one of Linda Gray’s co-workers allegedly 
repeatedly harassed her, including making tongue gestures 
mimicking oral sex, grabbing his crotch, touching her hair, 
grabbing her and shaking her, howling at her, staring at her, 
following her in the parking lot, and once even following her 
and her children home in the car.121 When the harassment esca-
lated, Gray had a severe panic attack and left work for 
months.122 After she reported the conduct and her employers 
took “no significant action,” Gray brought suit in federal court 
under Massachusetts’ anti-discrimination statute.123 The Mas-
sachusetts statute, similar to the federal statute, provides that 
it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an indi-
vidual “because of . . . sex.”124 However, the Massachusetts 
statute defines sexual harassment as involving “sexual advanc-
es, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature . . . .”125 The statute states that 
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of sex shall include, but not be 
limited to, sexual harassment.”126
Gray’s complaint cited to the entire anti-discrimination 




(1) Was the plaintiff, Linda Gray, subjected to sexual harassment, i.e. 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature? 
 The judge instructed the jury to ask the following 
questions:  
(2) Was that conduct offensive and/or unwelcome to plaintiff? 
(3) Was that conduct sufficiently severe and/or pervasive so as to alter 
the conditions of plaintiff’s employment by creating a work environ-
ment that a reasonable person would find intimidating, hostile, hu-
miliating or sexually offensive?128
Overall, the jury deliberated for more than seven hours be-
fore deciding that the harassment was not “severe and/or per-
vasive” enough to constitute a hostile work environment.
 
129
Gray appealed, arguing that the instructions could have 
led the jury to discount non-sexual conduct, and that this had 
 
 
 121. Id. at 131–32. 
 122. Id. at 132. 
 123. Id. at 128, 132. 
 124. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (2013). 
 125. See id. § 1(18). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Gray, 289 F.3d at 135. 
 128. Id. at 133 (emphasis added). 
 129. Id.  
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influenced its decision on the severe-or-pervasive element by 
excluding some of the most severe harassing behaviors (such as 
the stalking).130 The First Circuit held that, since Gray’s com-
plaint repeatedly phrased the claim in terms of “sexual har-
assment,” Gray had “narrowed her claim to ‘sexual harassment’ 
as defined by Massachusetts law.”131 Thus, it was not plain er-
ror to instruct the jury to consider only “conduct of a sexual na-
ture.”132 The court thought that “in the context of the trial,” the 
jury probably realized that the acts of intimidation could be 
considered as part of the pattern of sexual harassment, and 
therefore “it [was] doubtful that the jury was misled.”133
If Gray’s version of events were taken at face value, it would be hard 
to understand the jury’s finding that severe sexual harassment had 
not been proved . . . [W]e . . . think the outcome on question (3) sur-
prising, even allowing for what seems to have been a skillful defense 
[attacking Gray’s credibility].
 Yet, af-
ter dismissing Gray’s other arguments on procedural technical-
ities and upholding the jury verdict, the court opined:  
134
Thus, Gray, like LaMont and Haynie, directly addressed 
the disaggregation problem, yet, despite the court’s surprise at 
the outcome, it failed to recognize the harmful consequences of 
disaggregation.
 
135 All three cases have essentially utilized stat-
utory sexual harassment definitions to ossify disaggregation in-
to black-letter law.136
II.  BREAKING DOWN DISAGGREGATION AT THE STATE 
LEVEL   
  
The statutory definitions for sexual harassment have cre-
ated an unnecessary hurdle for victims of sex discrimination 
seeking justice against their employers. While perhaps adopted 
with the best intentions, states’ statutory definitions for sexual 
harassment have driven a wedge into sex discrimination law. 
At the state level, the problem goes far beyond the methodolog-
ical disaggregation Schultz identified;137
 
 130. See id. at 134 (summarizing plaintiff’s argument that the instructions 
“altered the outcome of the case by excluding merely threatening conduct”). 
 disaggregation has 
 131. Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
 132. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 141. 
 135. See generally id.; Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2003); 
LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2012). 
 136. See generally sources cited supra note 135. 
 137. See generally Schultz, supra note 16. 
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been officially crystallized in state civil rights acts. An analysis 
of the three cases that explore the operation of sexual harass-
ment definitions highlights the harmful effects of the defini-
tions on sex-based hostile work environment claims.138 First, at-
torneys are forced to decide whether to plead and argue non-
sexual “sex discrimination” or “sexual harassment,” but plead-
ing and arguing a combination of the two becomes tricky.139 In 
addition, the presence of the definition forces judges to create a 
bifurcated methodology, examining conduct that might rise to 
the level of “sexual harassment” in its own independent tier.140
Part II proceeds in four parts. Part A demonstrates how 
LaMont, Haynie, and Gray crystallize disaggregation via statu-
tory sexual harassment definitions.
 
Ultimately, the presence of the definitions legitimizes society 
and lawmakers’ focus on what is “sexual,” and undermines the 
states’ public policies of bringing an end to discrimination.  
141
A. LESSONS FROM LAMONT, HAYNIE, AND GRAY 
 Part B shows how the re-
sulting bifurcation creates intractable problems for pleading 
and briefing non-sexual or mixed harassment claims. Part C 
explains why courts’ methodologies are misguided, and Part D 
explores the advantages and disadvantages of adopting statu-
tory sexual harassment definitions.  
The three cases that directly consider the effect of statuto-
ry sexual harassment definitions on non-sexual or mixed har-
assment claims encapsulate the bifurcation of the law that can 
occur when courts grapple with the presence of those defini-
tions in their sex discrimination statutes.142 Haynie and Gray 
show how merely mentioning “sexual harassment” in pleadings 
can be fatal to a mixed or non-sexual harassment case.143
 
 138. See infra Part II.A (exploring the lessons learned from Gray, LaMont, 
and Haynie). 
 
LaMont offers an example of the operation of the vague and 
rigorous standard that discrimination victims must meet when 
proving that incidents of non-sexual harassment are severe or 
 139. See infra Part II.B (analyzing disaggregation problems at the pleading 
and briefing stages). 
 140. See infra Part II.C (illustrating courts’ disaggregation methodologies). 
 141. See generally Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2003); LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
728, 814 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2012). 
 142. See, e.g., Gray, 289 F.3d 128; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d 129; LaMont, 814 
N.W.2d 14. 
 143. See supra notes 96–97, 131 and accompanying text. 
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pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment.144 
All three opinions expressly create two separate causes of ac-
tion for a sex-discriminatory hostile work environment and 
formally disaggregate sexual and non-sexual claims.145
Haynie is perhaps the most problematic of these cases.
  
146 
Because Haynie’s attorneys made the mistake of pleading a 
“sexual harassment” claim, the Michigan Supreme Court de-
cided there was no need “to reach out and address whether 
[Michigan’s civil rights act] recognize[d] a claim for hostile 
work environment based on anything other than sexual har-
assment.”147 The court believed the Michigan legislature had 
created “two separate causes of action”—one for sexual har-
assment and one for sex discrimination—and therefore did not 
go on to consider the precise relationship between sexual har-
assment and non-sexual workplace conduct in contributing to a 
hostile work environment.148 By splitting hostile work environ-
ment cases into two separate causes of action, the court ensures 
that, in the future, judges will parse out the sexual from the 
non-sexual incidents when evaluating mixed sex discrimination 
claims. This will negatively impact the results of sex discrimi-
nation victims’ legitimate mixed and non-sexual harassment 
claims. Seemingly holding that Haynie had waived her non-
sexual harassment claim, the court failed to recognize that, in 
male-dominated fields such as law enforcement, sexual and 
non-sexual harassment serve the same “gender-guarding, com-
petence-undermining function . . . polic[ing] the boundaries of 
the work and protect[ing] its idealized masculine image . . . .”149
The Haynie rule ensures that sexual and non-sexual con-
duct will not be considered in combination when courts deter-
mine whether harassment is “because of sex” or is “severe or 
pervasive” enough to constitute a hostile work environment. 
This will make it difficult for plaintiffs to decide how to plead 
mixed harassment claims. Furthermore, it imposes unwarrant-
ed obstacles on plaintiffs who mistakenly frame their non-
sexual harassment claim as “sexual harassment,” even though 
members of the legal community—and courts—often refer to 
  
 
 144. See supra notes 115–16, 118 and accompanying text. 
 145. See supra notes 95, 114, 131 and accompanying text. 
 146. See generally Haynie, 664 N.W.2d 129. 
 147. Id. at 138.  
 148. See id. at 140 (“[T]he Michigan Legislature has specifically created a 
cause of action for both sex discrimination and sexual harassment.”). 
 149. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1691. 
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any sex-based hostile work environment claim as “sexual har-
assment.”150
While the Minnesota Supreme Court’s LaMont decision 
seems to represent the best outcome thus far for courts explicit-
ly considering the effect of sexual harassment definitions, the 
opinion is problematic in several ways. While the court decided 
that pleading a sexual harassment claim did not bar a concur-
rent non-sexual harassment claim, the court declared that sex-
ual harassment is a claim “separate and apart from” non-
sexual harassment.
 
151 The court failed to clarify the elements of 
the severe and pervasive requirement and never addressed 
whether both sexual and non-sexual incidents should be con-
sidered in combination when evaluating this prong. Thus, alt-
hough LaMont’s particular claim was primarily non-sexual, the 
ultimate impact of the opinion on mixed harassment claims is 
uncertain, but worrisome. As in Haynie, the court’s “separate 
and apart from” language152 seems to foreshadow a future pars-
ing out and two-tiered analysis of mixed sex discrimination 
claims, making it difficult for mixed harassment plaintiffs to 
prove discriminatory conduct is severe or pervasive. Further-
more, the court’s causation analysis is troublesome. The court 
failed to recognize the gender dynamics behind the non-sexual 
harassment. For example, the court dismissed LaMont’s claim 
without even considering her supervisor’s numerous attempts 
to undermine her competence by attacking her work product.153 
Nor did the court discuss the “hazing” incident where the su-
pervisor evoked LaMont’s fear of heights.154 Yet scholars con-
sider such hazing and competence-undermining to be some of 
the most harmful and insidious symptoms of sex discrimination 
in the workplace.155 Furthermore, the court wrongly dismissed 
several incidents of harassment because they were occasionally 
directed against men as well as women.156
 
 150. See, e.g., supra notes 
 By discounting these 
incidents due to lack of causation, the court ignored the dis-
criminatory context, and the fact that such forms of harass-
ment become severe or pervasive when coupled with blatant 
130–34 and accompanying text. 
 151. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. 2012). 
 152. Id. See generally Haynie, 664 N.W.2d 129. 
 153. LaMont Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 99, at 5–8.  
 154. Id. at 8. 
 155. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1762–69; see sources cited supra note 55. 
 156. See LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 23.  
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segregation and denigrating comments about women.157
Finally, Gray shows us that not only are judges using 
states’ statutory sexual harassment definitions to officially dis-
aggregate non-sexual and sexual harassment claims, but they 
may not be aware of the negative consequences of adopting 
such a methodology, even when those negative consequences 
are staring them in the face. The First Circuit interpreted the 
Massachusetts statute in much the same way as the Haynie 
and LaMont courts, encouraging future courts to consider sex-
ual harassment and non-sexual harassment as separate causes 
of action when determining whether there is a hostile work en-
vironment.
 
158 The court failed to recognize the important role 
disaggregation and bifurcation of harassment claims can play 
in a jury’s determination of whether the severe-or-pervasive el-
ement has been met. The jury was clearly instructed to consid-
er only whether the sexually charged conduct added up to a 
hostile work environment, which likely meant the jury dis-
counted the staring, stalking, and other forms of less explicitly 
sexual harassment.159 Yet despite the court’s surprise at the 
strange jury verdict and its sympathy for Gray’s plight, it still 
held that any procedural missteps were harmless error.160 
While Gray, a mixed harassment case, offered the perfect op-
portunity for the court to recognize the harmful effects of the 
disaggregation problem and avoid driving a wedge into sex dis-
crimination jurisprudence, the court ultimately chose to limit 
the plaintiff’s claim and failed to seriously entertain the possi-
bility that “the jury was misled” by the sexual-focused instruc-
tions, much less understand the subtle harms of disaggrega-
tion.161
The above court decisions establish precedents or models 
that will serve as obstacles to legitimate sex discrimination ac-
tions by diluting the strength of mixed harassment claims and 
trivializing non-sexual harassment. For example, the Haynie 
decision has already spawned a series of dismissals by limiting 
  
 
 157. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1800 (“In the context of a workplace 
with longstanding inequality . . . an apparently gender-neutral act of hazing 
may assume heightened causal significance.” (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring))). 
 158. Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 135–36 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 159. Id. at 133. 
 160. See id. at 137–38, 141 (“Certainly, the full complement of conduct al-
leged in this case obviously ‘would alter a reasonable woman’s work environ-
ment’ . . . .”).  
 161. Id. at 136. 
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plaintiffs’ mixed harassment claims to their sexual components, 
even though the Haynie decision did not necessarily bar non-
sexual harassment claims.162 In light of these three opinions, it 
seems likely that other state courts will allow the presence of 
statutory sexual harassment definitions to imperil sex discrim-
ination plaintiffs’ meritorious claims for non-sexual or mixed 
harassment. Since six states have yet to explicitly consider the 
effect of the sexual harassment definitions,163
B. DISAGGREGATION PROBLEMS AT THE PLEADING AND 
BRIEFING LEVEL 
 and more states 
may develop such definitions in the future, the problem is like-
ly to escalate over time. 
The first roadblock that statutory definitions of sexual 
harassment impose is at the level of pleading and briefing. At-
torneys are faced with the unenviable task of deciding whether 
to plead and argue their plaintiffs’ claims as a single cause of 
action for “sex discrimination” that attempts to fold the sexual 
harassment into a larger sex discrimination claim, to plead and 
argue them in the alternative, or to choose one or the other and 
hope for the best. All of these approaches have their drawbacks, 
which are best illustrated in mixed cases. In a mixed harass-
ment case, if plaintiff’s counsel pleads claims under an “um-
brella” cause of action—arguing “sex discrimination” that in-
cludes incidents of “sexual harassment”—there is the risk that 
the pleading will use the phrase “sexual harassment” too fre-
quently. Courts could respond in the way of Haynie and Gray, 
 
 162. See, e.g., Kalich v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 473 (6th Cir. 
2012) (dismissing claim because the “majority of the comments . . . cited in 
[the] complaint cannot be construed as sexual in nature”); Corley v. Detroit 
Bd. of Educ., 681 N.W.2d 342, 343, 346 (Mich. 2004) (framing plaintiff’s claim 
as “sexual harassment” and dismissing it for being non-sexual in nature, even 
though plaintiff brought the claim under the entire sex discrimination provi-
sion); Schmitt v. City of E. Lansing, No. 307571, 2012 WL 6913785, at *3–5 
(Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2012) (dismissing a claim because “[t]here is no indi-
cation that [the harasser] continuously exhibited sexual conduct toward plain-
tiff that created a hostile work environment”). 
 163. To my knowledge, courts in Connecticut, Illinois, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, Vermont, and Wisconsin have not yet considered whether their states’ 
sexual harassment definitions disaggregate sex discrimination claims. See 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(8) (2013); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2011); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(14) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02 (2014); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(13) (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(13) (2014). 
In addition, in Massachusetts, the issue was considered by a federal, not a 
state, court. See Gray, 289 F.3d at 141. 
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discounting any conduct that was non-sexual.164
The problem is likely to be even more severe in states 
where the effect of the statutory definitions has not yet been lit-
igated, since plaintiffs will not have access to precedent to warn 
them of the potential pigeonholing effect of using “sexual har-
assment” in their complaints or briefs. In these states, attor-
neys trying to do their clients justice must have the foresight to 
predict the disaggregation problem or risk the demise of the 
plaintiffs’ claims due to a technicality in the pleadings or mo-
tions. However, the potential for a disaggregation problem is 
far from intuitive. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are likely to be caught 
by surprise when opposing counsel raises the “non-sexual” ar-
gument as a defense.
 Under the 
Haynie and Gray decisions, it is unclear exactly how many 
times the phrase “sexual harassment” must appear in a com-
plaint or brief before a claim is relegated to the narrower cate-
gory of “sexual harassment” rather than the broader umbrella 
of “sex discrimination.” On the other hand, if plaintiffs’ lawyers 
plead and argue two separate causes of action in the alterna-
tive—one for “sexual harassment” and one for “sex discrimina-
tion”—courts will likely become confused, consider the claims 
as mutually exclusive, and parse out the sexual from the non-
sexual conduct. This will effectively bifurcate the claims into 
two—one for sexual harassment and one for non-sexual har-
assment—making it difficult for plaintiffs to meet the severe-
or-pervasive requirement or to prove that the non-sexual con-
duct, when viewed in light of the concurrent sexual harass-
ment, had underlying gender-based motivations. Finally, plain-
tiffs could choose to argue only one cause of action. But if 
plaintiffs choose to plead and argue only “sexual harassment,” 
they might have waived their opportunity to include incidents 
of non-sexual discrimination that would ultimately strengthen 
their hostile work environment claim. And if plaintiffs plead 
“sex discrimination,” the court may discount sexual conduct be-
cause the “sexual harassment” claim was waived.  
165
 
 164. Gray, 289 F.3d at 135–36; Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 135 
(Mich. 2003). 
 After all, most workplace sex discrimi-
nation claims are brought under Title VII, where there is no 
explicit, statutory distinction between sexual and non-sexual 
 165. See Interview with David Schlesinger, Attorney for LaMont, in Min-
neapolis, Minn. (Sept. 21, 2012) (“I was totally surprised. I did not see it [com-
ing]. I did not think it was likely that our case would be dismissed on those 
grounds.”). 
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harassment.166 Furthermore, the patchwork of law on sex dis-
crimination is nebulous.167 Since so many hostile work envi-
ronment cases are in fact sexual in nature, and these cases 
have received a copious amount of attention from the law and 
the media168
In sum, attorneys pleading sex discrimination claims in 
states with statutory definitions for sexual harassment face a 
catch-22. No matter which course they choose, courts will likely 
either bifurcate their mixed claims or, if plaintiffs mention 
“sexual harassment” in their briefs, completely exclude allega-
tions of non-sexual harassment. 
 and form essential precedent, it is difficult to talk 
about sex discrimination law, much less plead a claim, without 
using the magic words “sexual harassment.” 
C. THE COURTS’ DISAGGREGATING METHODOLOGY 
Courts’ handling of sexual harassment definitions is sever-
ing sexual harassment from broader discrimination claims un-
der their states’ statutes. Their opinions do not offer an effec-
tive means for analyzing sex discrimination claims. After all, 
the true cause of action for both sexual and non-sexual harass-
ment arises from a single statutory provision generally prohib-
iting workplace discrimination “because of . . . sex.”169 Since 
many plaintiffs will bring mixed claims of sex discrimination 
based on both sexual and non-sexual incidents,170
 
 166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
 it makes no 
sense to require plaintiffs to avoid the words “sexual harass-
ment” when pleading and arguing their cases. The harmful 
consequences of requiring mixed harassment plaintiffs to avoid 
using the term “sexual harassment” underscores the problem-
atic disaggregation of workplace sex discrimination law. Since 
the relationship between sexual harassment and sex discrimi-
nation is difficult to grasp, courts should not punish plaintiffs 
for their attorneys’ understandable use of the “sexual harass-
ment” vocabulary in pleading and briefing. Attorneys may not 
foresee a state statute’s potential to deviate from well-
established federal case law. While it is true that harassers 
 167. See Schultz, supra note 16, at 1747 (“[T]he focus on sexual conduct has 
opened up as many questions as it has answered, embroiling judges in tension-
filled rulings that create a patchwork of justice.”). 
 168. See id. at 1695–96.  
 169. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 170. See, e.g., Kannenberg v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 571 N.W.2d 
165, 174–75 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). 
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may not be relying on prior case law when they discriminate on 
the job, that does not mean plaintiffs’ attorneys are not relying 
on prior case law when they write their complaints and briefs. 
Judicial decisions can influence how attorneys plead and brief 
their cases in the future, and this should be considered when 
determining the impact of precedent on the viability of non-
sexual or mixed harassment claims pled as “sexual harass-
ment.”171
Courts do have a duty to fulfill the intent of the state legis-
lature when interpreting statutes.
 At the very least, when courts consider the issue as a 
matter of first impression, they should allow plaintiffs to 
amend their pleadings. 
172 Readers may wonder what 
the purpose of a sexual harassment definition is, if not to create 
a separate cause of action.173 The fact that state legislatures 
have diverged from Congress’s model by incorporating a statu-
tory definition seems potentially significant.174 However, state 
legislatures might merely be trying to replicate federal law by 
incorporating the EEOC guidelines into the definitions section 
of their civil rights acts. Taking a broad perspective on the is-
sue, it seems likely that Haynie and Gray fail to fulfill legisla-
tive intent. The fact that the definitions tend to mimic EEOC 
guidelines most likely evinces an intent to mirror, not diverge 
from, federal law.175 While it is true that disaggregation is oc-
curring at the federal level as well, it is primarily because of 
the federal courts’ failure to properly apply the law.176
 
 171. In Haynie, the court addressed a potential stare decisis issue, since it 
had previously held that non-sexual conduct could constitute sexual harass-
ment. The court explained that since plaintiff’s decedent could not have relied 
on the earlier court’s decision to her detriment, there was no stare decisis is-
sue. See Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 136–38 (Mich. 2003). 
 By hold-
 172. See, e.g., Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003) (“Our 
purpose in construing a statutory provision is to give effect to legislative in-
tent.”); Keck v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 108 P.2d 162, 164 (Okla. 1940) (“It is a 
cardinal rule that in the construction of statutes the legislative intent must 
govern . . . .”). 
 173. See Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 139–40 (noting the significance of the fact 
that the Michigan Civil Rights Act differs from the federal act by defining sex-
ual harassment). 
 174. See Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2002) (em-
phasizing the differences between the Massachusetts and federal statutes); 
Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 139–40. 
 175. See Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 145 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) (“By codify-
ing the federal guidelines, our Legislature merely clarified that the sexual-
harassment protections in the federal statutes were analogous in scope to 
those in Michigan’s Civil Rights Act.”). 
 176. See generally McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985), abro-
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ing that pleading “sexual harassment” limits a plaintiff’s claim 
to only conduct of a sexual nature,177 the Haynie and Gray deci-
sions diverge from federal law, officially legitimize disaggrega-
tion, and encourage the proliferation of a disaggregating meth-
odology. Furthermore, the fact that state legislatures generally 
provide definitions stating that sex discrimination “includes” 
sexual harassment178 should be an argument against drawing 
an unnecessary distinction between sexual harassment and 
other sex discrimination claims, since the use of “includes” sug-
gests sexual harassment is simply one manifestation of the 
broader “sex discrimination.”179 In light of the legislatures’ clear 
purposes of ending discrimination,180
Of course, not all state judges have read the work of mod-
ern scholars highlighting the disaggregation problem, and thus 
courts may not truly understand the difficulties they produce 
when they bifurcate claims.
 it is difficult to believe 
that legislatures would have chosen to bifurcate and limit 
plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claims. If both sexual and non-
sexual harassment are “because of . . . sex,” it is best to view 
them cumulatively as different permutations of the same un-
derlying sex discrimination. There is no reason to limit claims 
with non-sexual components. 
181 Judges may not even realize that 
they are parsing out the sexual from the non-sexual conduct 
and performing a two-tiered severe-or-pervasive analysis. In 
Gray, for example, the court failed to recognize how disaggrega-
tion influenced the jury’s decision on the severe-or-pervasive 
prong.182
 
gated by Stevens v. Dep’t of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991); Schultz, supra note 
 If other appellate judges do not foresee how the two-
tiered approach weakens mixed harassment claims, LaMont 
16, at 1732–38 (explaining that the McKinney court applied good law, but that 
subsequent courts have failed to follow it properly). 
 177. Gray, 289 F.3d at 135; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 136. 
 178. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B § 1 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2103(i) 
(2013). 
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Umbacia, No. 8:05-CR-99-T-24EAJ, 2005 
WL 1424821, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. June 17, 2005) (noting that the use of the 
word “includes” suggests that the following list is not exhaustive). 
 180. See, e.g., Noecker v. Dep’t of Corr., 512 N.W.2d 44, 45 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1993) (“The purpose of the [Michigan Civil Rights] [A]ct is to prevent discrimi-
nation directed against a person because of that person’s membership in a cer-
tain class and to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, 
prejudices, and biases.”). 
 181. See Gray, 289 F.3d at 136 (claiming it was “doubtful that the jury was 
misled”). 
 182. See id. 
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suggests that they may uphold lower courts’ severe-or-
pervasive findings and affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims, 
even if the lower court was analyzing the severity or pervasive-
ness of the sexual and non-sexual harassment separately. 
Finally, even in cases where courts rightly decide the ex-
plicit “sexual” vs. “non-sexual” issue, as in LaMont, they may 
fail to see the true harm and severity of non-sexual conduct.183 
Courts may point out that some forms of harassment are di-
rected toward both men and women but may not consider how 
the plaintiff—and the mythical reasonable woman—would per-
ceive such harassment in light of other discriminatory remarks 
and the historical suppression of women.184 The severe-or-
pervasive prong of a hostile work environment claim focuses on 
the effects of the harassment, not the intent of the harasser.185 
For a plaintiff who has been told she is unworthy and stupid 
because she is a woman, being screamed at acquires more sin-
ister overtones—regardless of whether men are also berated on 
occasion. It is difficult to see how, as in LaMont, being 
screamed at, segregated from men, hazed, and having one’s 
competence repeatedly undermined by unwarranted attacks on 
work product, could not interfere with the “conditions of em-
ployment” and impair one’s ability to perform the work.186 Yet 
courts will likely dismiss the majority of incidents of non-sexual 
harassment as failing the “because of . . . sex” component, be-
cause the courts fail to see the wider pattern of discrimination. 
Considering that verbal assaults, social segregation, and com-
petence-undermining are some of the forms of harassment that 
are traditionally used to drive women out of the workplace,187
 
 183. See supra notes 
 
failing to recognize them as gender-motivated, or severe or per-
vasive enough for a hostile work environment claim, hinders 
progress toward a more equitable society.  
55–61 and accompanying text. 
 184. See LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 
2012) (discarding certain instances of harassment because the supervisor simi-
larly harassed male employees). 
 185. See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that part of the severe-or-pervasive test is whether “the conduct un-
reasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance”). 
 186. See LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 16–19.  
 187. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 16, at 1762–69 (highlighting the compe-
tence-undermining function of a hostile work environment). 
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D. TO DEFINE OR NOT TO DEFINE? THE PROS AND CONS OF 
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS  
By now it should be clear that defining “sexual harass-
ment” within a state’s civil rights statute has numerous nega-
tive effects. As shown above, the three cases that explicitly con-
sider the operation of the definitions nicely illustrate how such 
definitions not only exacerbate, but actually formally crystalize, 
the disaggregation problem. However, there are some interest-
ing advantages to legislatures’ decisions to include the defini-
tions which are also worthy of consideration.  
For many years, federal courts refused to recognize sexual-
ly harassing behaviors as a form of sex discrimination.188 The 
courts were not convinced that such harassment met the causa-
tion requirement and was discrimination “because of . . . sex.”189 
It was only after the tireless efforts of early feminists that the 
law began to recognize it as sex discrimination.190 By adopting 
statutory definitions of “sexual harassment,” legislatures thus 
ensure that the long struggle of early feminists for recognition 
of sexual harassment as sex discrimination would not have to 
be relived in the state courts. In other words, the sexual har-
assment definitions statutorily overcame the problematic cau-
sation hurdle. The sexual aspects of the harassment serve as 
convenient proxies that help give an inference of causation,191
Furthermore, as parties litigate over the presence and op-
eration of the definition, it brings the disaggregation problem to 
the forefront. At the very least, the LaMont, Haynie, and Gray 
cases concretely illustrate and evaluate the disaggregation 
problem, vindicating Vicki Schultz and other scholar’s observa-
tions despite certain feminists’ refusal to acknowledge the prob-
lem exists.
 
and thus the inclusion of the definitions arguably gives sexual 
harassment plaintiffs a clearer path to success. 
192
 
 188. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 
 As the three cases explicitly considering the effect 
26.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1704–05. 
 191. See id. at 1744 (“In the absence of clear criteria for determining 
whether harassment is directed at workers because of their identities as men 
or women, judges may look to sexual conduct as a proxy.”). 
 192. Vicki Schultz is a relative newcomer to the field relative to Catharine 
MacKinnon. After Schultz criticized some of Catharine MacKinnon’s assump-
tions, Schultz, supra note 16, at 1704–05, MacKinnon in return suggested that 
the disaggregation problem is worthy of nothing more than a footnote, see 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Afterword, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW 696–97 n.22 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); see 
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of the definitions show, litigation over the “sexual” issue can 
force courts to consider the relationship between sexual and 
non-sexual harassment within the broader category of sex dis-
crimination. Thus, the presence of sexual harassment defini-
tions in state statutes could actually give courts the chance to 
address the disaggregation problem head-on. 
Unfortunately, thus far the case law shows that courts are 
not taking advantage of this opportunity, and are instead using 
the definitions to impose additional barriers to recovery for sex 
discrimination plaintiffs. It seems the problem with sexual 
harassment definitions is not that they exist, but rather that 
they are being misinterpreted and likely require tweaking. The 
case law suggests that, so far, statutory definitions of sexual 
harassment have likely done more harm than good. However, if 
approached correctly, the presence of the definitions could force 
consideration of the issue and lead other courts and judges to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of the disaggregation 
problems in sex discrimination law.  
III.  OVERCOMING THE DISAGGREGATION BARRIER   
In the spirit of collaboration, lawyers, judges, and lawmak-
ers should utilize strategies to contain and mitigate the dis-
aggregation problem rooted in states’ statutory sexual harass-
ment definitions. In fact, judges and lawmakers could use the 
sexual harassment definitions to combat the disaggregation 
problem once and for all, at least at the state level. Part A of 
this section suggests that courts wield their states’ sexual har-
assment definitions to develop explicit “aggregation rules,” 
clearing the path for non-sexual and mixed harassment claims. 
Part B explains how legislatures should adopt sexual harass-
ment definitions and contextualize them using clear statutory 
language and an “aggregation provision.” Finally, Part C pro-
poses that state lawmakers, employers, and human resources 
managers rethink laws and policies that focus only on sexual 
harassment and draw attention away from other forms of dis-
crimination. 
A. AGGREGATION RULES 
To avoid the injustices that might result from disaggrega-
 
also Kathryn Abrams, Subordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment Law, 
in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 192, at 111–12 (argu-
ing for collaboration in addressing these issues and criticizing the antago-
nism).   
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tion, courts should develop LaMont-like holdings that do not 
force attorneys to avoid the phrase “sexual harassment” when 
pleading non-sexual harassment claims. However, courts 
should avoid the dicta in LaMont stating that the statutory def-
inition creates a sexual harassment claim “separate and apart 
from” non-sexual harassment,193 since this kind of dicta will 
eventually lead to the bifurcation of mixed harassment claims. 
Instead, judges should adopt an “aggregation rule” and explicit-
ly hold that the existence of the sexual harassment definition in 
the state statute does not create two separate causes of action. 
Courts should state specifically that discriminatory conduct of 
a non-sexual nature should be considered in combination with 
sexually charged conduct in assessing any sex discrimination 
claim based on a hostile work environment. Using the existing 
statutes,194 judges can ground these holdings (1) in the fact that 
the state statutes create a single cause of action for discrimina-
tion “because of . . . sex,”195 and (2) in the language of sexual 
harassment definitions, which generally state that sex discrim-
ination “includes” sexual harassment.196
Finally, courts should pay attention to studies suggesting 
that non-sexual harassment may actually be more harmful to 
victim’s careers and psyches and the struggle for equal repre-
sentation at all levels in the workforce.
 To ensure that they 
are implementing the aggregation rule, courts should pay close 
attention to their own severe-or-pervasive and causation anal-
yses to better identify when they are weakening the plaintiffs’ 
claims by parsing out the sexual from the non-sexual incidents.  
197 Furthermore, schol-
ars have noted that non-sexual conduct such as competence-
undermining and hazing are classic examples of some of the 
most harmful kinds of sex discrimination in the workforce.198
 
 193. LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14, 19 (Minn. 2012). 
 
When analyzing whether or not discriminatory conduct is sex-
motivated, or severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile 
work environment, courts should consider the larger pattern 
and actual impact of the conduct and set aside any precon-
ceived notions of what the quintessential sex discrimination 
claim looks like.  
 194. See sources cited supra note 62. 
 195. But see 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102 (2011) (outlawing “unlawful dis-
crimination” and “sexual harassment” in separate subdivisions). 
 196. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 198. Schultz, supra note 16, at 1687, 1762–69; see sources cited supra note 
55. 
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Attorneys can help set courts on the right path. Until 
courts adopt aggregation rules, attorneys arguing sex discrimi-
nation claims under state statutes that contain sexual harass-
ment definitions must plead and brief their cases carefully to 
avoid dismissal on a technicality.199 While the lawyers in 
Haynie and Gray brought suit under the civil rights acts in 
general, they made the fatal error of using the term “sexual 
harassment” too often.200 In contrast, the lawyers in LaMont 
brought a single claim with one cause of action, but repeatedly 
framed it as one of “sex discrimination” as well as “sexual har-
assment.”201
Ultimately, when choosing whether to frame their claims 
as a single cause of action or two separate causes of action, at-
 Thus, a cursory review of the cases might suggest 
that pleading a single cause of action for both types of harass-
ment might increase the chances of success in other states that 
have not yet litigated the issue. However, pleading a single 
cause of action has its disadvantages. By pleading “sexual har-
assment” as part of the “sex discrimination” claim, attorneys 
encourage courts to analyze the “sexual harassment” claim 
separately and perform an independent sexual-focused analysis 
utilizing the sexual harassment definition. This may encourage 
courts to parse out the sexual from non-sexual incidents during 
a severe-or-pervasive or causation analysis, or simply dismiss 
both claims if neither has sufficient foundation independent of 
the other. And, in some states, if attorneys with mixed claims 
only plead under the broader umbrella of sex discrimination 
and avoid the phrase “sexual harassment” altogether, the court 
could prohibit them from utilizing the relatively clearer ele-
ments of the sexual harassment definition in their arguments 
or consider the “sexual harassment” claim waived and therefore 
refuse to consider any sexual incidents at all as part of the 
broader sex discrimination claim.  
 
 199. See Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 135 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(“Gray’s complaint did cite section 151B’s discrimination provision at the out-
set but the rest of the complaint phrased the claim, and did so repeatedly, in 
terms of ‘sexual harassment.’ In other words, Gray narrowed her claim to 
‘sexual harassment’ as defined by Massachusetts law.”); Haynie v. State, 664 
N.W.2d 129, 138 (Mich. 2003) (“[P]laintiff's only allegation here is that the 
employee was sexually harassed and that this sexual harassment created a 
hostile work environment. Therefore, the only issue before us is whether 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of sexual harassment.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 200. Gray, 289 F.3d at 135; Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 138.  
 201. Complaint at 5–6, LaMont v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 814 N.W.2d 14 
(Minn. 2012) (No. A10-543).  
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torneys should consider the pros and cons of pleading one or 
both causes of action based on the specific facts of their case. 
Attorneys who have cases that are either “sexual” or “non-
sexual” in nature, but not both, can skirt the disaggregation 
problem and avoid dismissal of their claims by pleading either 
“sexual harassment” or “sex discrimination,” but not both. At-
torneys with mixed harassment cases face a more difficult pre-
dicament. The best solution may be to plead separate counts for 
“sexual harassment” and “sex discrimination” and submit briefs 
that carefully contextualize the “sexual” conduct within a 
broader sex discrimination framework. In their complaints, at-
torneys could be sure to state that their broader sex discrimina-
tion claim “includes” the sexual harassment components, and 
incorporate their sexual harassment arguments by reference.  
Such an approach would allow plaintiffs to argue the ele-
ments of sexual harassment definitions while encouraging 
judges to view the incidents of sexual harassment within the 
broader context of sex discrimination. By framing sexual har-
assment as a narrower claim within the sex-based discrimina-
tion claim in their initial complaints and briefs, plaintiff’s at-
torneys can draw attention to the potential disaggregation 
problem before it occurs. Ultimately, this may help encourage 
judges to develop aggregation rules. Of course, adopting an ag-
gregation rule does not determine the outcome of any particu-
lar claim, but merely ensures that courts use a methodology 
that takes account of the discriminatory pattern as a whole, in-
cluding both sexual and non-sexual components. 
B. AGGREGATION PROVISIONS 
As explained above, sexual harassment definitions as they 
currently stand most likely do more harm than good by con-
tributing to the disaggregation problem. Although the defini-
tions do ensure that the “sexual” nature of conduct will serve as 
a proxy for causation, legislatures may not worry about paving 
the way for sexual harassment claims because state courts will 
model their interpretation of their statutes, which parallel Title 
VII, after federal courts’ interpretations.202
 
 202. See LaMont, 814 N.W.2d at 21. 
 Thus, at first blush, 
it may seem that avoiding adoption of a sexual harassment def-
inition altogether is the best solution. However, to the contrary, 
a properly adopted sexual harassment definition can prevent 
the disaggregation methodology seen at the federal level from 
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infecting state sex discrimination law. Ultimately, the best way 
for legislatures to avoid disaggregation is most likely by com-
batting the problem head-on. 
The case law shows that mere adoption of sexual harass-
ment definitions that mirror the EEOC’s will result in official 
bifurcation of sexual and non-sexual claims.203 Therefore, legis-
latures should adopt sexual harassment definitions only if they 
also provide additional context.204 For example, lawmakers 
could include an explicit statement that the civil rights act 
“creates a single cause of action for both sexual and non-sexual 
sex discrimination.” Lawmakers should include specific instruc-
tions to courts that “sexual and non-sexual conduct shall be 
considered together or in combination” in assessing the viabil-
ity of a hostile work environment claim for sex discrimination. 
In addition, legislators should direct courts to consider the cu-
mulative psychological impact of both types of harassment, in 
combination, by providing definitions of “severe or pervasive” 
that encourage courts to combine both non-sexual and sexually 
charged conduct in their analyses. This should provide clear 
enough guidance to rid courts of disaggregating methodologies 
altogether. Since the disaggregation problem still persists in 
federal cases,205
C. WORKPLACE POLICIES TO COMBAT ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION 
 the end result would be state anti-
discrimination acts that offer better protection against sex dis-
crimination than the federal CRA. 
Because hostile work environment law has largely devel-
oped within the realm of sexual harassment,206
 
 203. See, e.g., Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 144–45 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting) 
(noting the strong similarities between the relevant provision of Michigan’s 
Civil Rights Act and EEOC guidelines while criticizing the majority for nar-
rowing sex discrimination claims to those of a sexual nature). 
 less sexual 
forms of discriminatory harassment simply do not fit with the 
law’s quintessential “image” of workplace sex discrimination. 
Lawmakers, employers, and human resource personnel should 
 204. Of course, the EEOC could also help combat the disaggregation prob-
lem by changing its guidelines. However, this Note focuses on solutions at the 
state-law level. 
 205. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 206. See generally Schultz, supra note 16 (discussing the prevalence of 
thinking about sex-based harassment in terms of sexuality and arguing for the 
reconceptualization of sexual harassment). 
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rethink policies that draw attention to sexual harassment and 
ignore other, arguably more harmful forms of discrimination.  
Studies suggest the actual harms of non-sexual harass-
ment are just as severe, if not worse than, the harms of sexual 
harassment.207 Therefore, state legislatures, regulatory agen-
cies, and employer policymakers should amend the portions of 
their statutes, rules, or policies that require employers to pro-
vide employees with information on sexual harassment to also 
require employers to provide information on non-sexual, dis-
criminatory harassment, including hazing and competence-
undermining because of sex. Legislatures have played into a 
sexual-centered approach by requiring employers to hang post-
ers decrying sexual harassment in the workplace.208 To discour-
age the trivialization of non-sexual harassment, legislatures 
should demand that employers develop clear policies against, 
and provide training to prevent, all forms of illegal, discrimina-
tory conduct. Studies show that sexual harassment training 
and the distribution of information about sexual harassment 
laws have helped give women the tools they need to fight sexu-
al harassment.209 In fact, sexual harassment, even when it does 
occur, causes less harm because women now feel empowered to 
be better able to cope with sexual harassment in the work-
place.210
  CONCLUSION   
 There is no good reason to limit training and aware-
ness-raising efforts to sexual harassment. 
In states that have adopted sexual harassment definitions, 
the disaggregation problem, which has been visible between the 
lines in sex discrimination opinions for years at the federal lev-
el, has finally fully surfaced, but unfortunately the result is 
that disaggregation has been crystallized into state law. Thus 
far, the effect of statutory definitions for sexual harassment is 
essentially codification of the disaggregation problem. The def-
initions, as they stand, have allowed courts to explicitly and 
formally bifurcate state sex discrimination law. The result is 
 
 207. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
 208. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-124 (2011) (“Each entity of state gov-
ernment shall post in the workplace the state policy for the prevention of sex-
ual harassment established pursuant to Acts 1993, chapter 307.”); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 342.700 (2013) (“A school district’s sexual harassment policy shall be 
posted on a sign that is at least 8.5 by 11 inches in size.”). 
 209. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 210. See id. 
  
2014] DISAGGREGATION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1979 
 
that plaintiffs bringing meritorious claims for non-sexual or 
mixed harassment have faced, and will continue to face, insur-
mountable barriers to relief. The problem is only exacerbated 
by society and employers’ vision of sexual harassment as the 
quintessential form of sex discrimination. 
However, in the right context, sexual harassment defini-
tions could actually offer a solution. Judges can use the defini-
tions to encourage the aggregation of sex discrimination claims 
and ensure that non-sexual and sexual elements are not parsed 
out. Even better, sexual harassment definitions present legisla-
tures with a unique opportunity to adopt aggregation provi-
sions that will ensure the disaggregation problem does not ma-
terialize in their states’ courts. Ultimately, this could make 
state-level sex discrimination claims a better option for plain-
tiffs than Title VII claims, which still may encounter informal 
disaggregation methodologies in federal courts. Tweaking laws 
and policies to shift away from a singular focus on sexual har-
assment will also aid in combatting the disaggregation prob-
lem. Just as employees should not have to use sex appeal to get 
ahead in the workplace, sex discrimination claims should not 
have to be “sexy” to garner the attention of lawmakers, courts, 
and policymakers. 
 
